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The State Secrets Privilege in the
Post-9/11 Era
Steven D. Schwinn*
Introduction
On February 9, 2009, a lawyer from the Department of
Justice stood before a three-judge panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to answer a much
anticipated question in a case involving government
extraordinary rendition and torture: Would the new
administration, under President Obama, defend the position of
the Bush administration and seek complete dismissal of the
case because it involved a state secret?
The attorney‘s answer: Yes.1
This answer baffled many. After all, President Obama
came to office promising a new era of government openness and
transparency.2 He promised to discontinue many of the
controversial policies in the Bush administration‘s ―War on
Terror.‖3
Specifically, he promised to reevaluate the
Government‘s position on the state secrets privilege.4
The state secrets privilege started as a common law
evidentiary privilege that protected evidence if there was a

* Associate professor of law, the John Marshall Law School. Thank you
to my colleague Professor Walter Kendall for valuable comments on this
Article. Thank you to Dean John Corkery and Associate Dean Ralph
Ruebner for their generous summer research support. Thank you to the
editorial staff of the Pace Law Review for allowing me to participate in this
important volume on national security and the Constitution and for their
outstanding editorial work on this Article. All errors are, of course, my own.
1. Audio file: Oral argument in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,
563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended and superseded by 579 F.3d 949 (9th
Cir. 2009), petition for reh’g en banc granted by 586 F.3d 1108, available at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=0000002777.
2. See, e.g., Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President on
National Security (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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―reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence [would]
expose military matters which, in the interest of national
security, should not be divulged.‖5 In the cases involving secret
executive programs developed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks,
however, the Government has repeatedly pressed to turn the
privilege into something more like a justiciability doctrine—a
claim that would foreclose all litigation on a matter when the
very subject of litigation is a state secret.
If that is not dramatic enough, the Government also
presented a new argument in the post-9/11 cases: that the state
secrets privilege was rooted in the President‘s Article II powers
This argument amplified the
in the Constitution.6
Government‘s already sweeping state secrets claims and, if
accepted by the courts, meant that the administration could
effectively shut down all judicial challenges against the
Government, or its partners, based only on the claimed harms
resulting from these programs.
The Government‘s arguments predictably spawned
criticism. In response, the new administration announced that
it would review all pending cases in which the prior
administration had maintained this extraordinary claim.7
Additionally, Congress reintroduced legislation to rein in the
administration and control the use of the privilege.8 Given the
Government‘s continuing position on the state secrets privilege,
as well as several court rulings on that privilege, the proposed
legislation falls short.
This Article examines the Government‘s position on the
state secrets privilege in the post-9/11 cases. It argues that the
Government‘s new position, first under President Bush and
now under President Obama, marks an important and
disturbing change in how it considers and treats the privilege.
In these cases, the Government has dramatically expanded the
privilege in four discrete dimensions. First, the Government

5. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
6. See, e.g., Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1003.
7. Steven Aftergood, Eric Holder on State Secrets, OLC Opinion,
SECRECY
NEWS,
Feb.
2,
2009,
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2009/02/holder.html.
8. State Secret Protection Act of 2009, S. 417, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009); State Secret Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 984, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009).
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has argued that the state secrets privilege has constitutional
roots. Next, it has attempted to minimize the roles of the
courts in policing the privilege. Third, it has negated private
litigants‘ interests in their cases against the Government and
its partners.
Finally, it has argued that courts must
completely dismiss those cases in which it decrees that the very
subject matter is a state secret.
If reform efforts are to succeed, they must take account of
these characteristics of the Government‘s position, as well as
the reported decision of one circuit court.
To appreciate the significance of the changes in the
Government‘s position, it helps to put them in historical and
jurisprudential perspective. Thus, this Article starts by tracing
the sources of the state secrets privilege. It shows how the
contemporary state secrets privilege evolved from two related
but distinct cases—one creating a complete bar to a very
narrow category of litigation, and the other creating an
evidentiary privilege.
This Article then examines the applications of the state
secrets privilege in the last three decades, in the cases that
form the basis of the Government‘s claims today. I argue that
the cases fall roughly into two categories, correlating with the
two sources of the state secrets privilege. Thus, cases in one
category treat the privilege as a common law evidentiary
privilege, while cases in the other treat it more like a
justiciability issue.
Next, the Article examines the Government‘s position on
the state secrets privilege in the post-9/11 cases. I argue that
the Government‘s position on the privilege builds on the second
category of cases explained above. I also show that the
Government in these cases makes the novel claim that the
state secrets privilege is rooted in the Constitution. As a
result, the Government claims a dramatically expanded
privilege, which, if adopted by the courts, could mean that the
Government could entirely shut down cases, with little judicial
intervention, merely by asserting that their very subject matter
is a state secret. This expanded view of the state secrets
doctrine lacks support in the history and the precedent of the
privilege.
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I. The Sources of State Secrets
The state secrets privilege derives primarily from two
cases: Totten v. United States9 and United States v. Reynolds.10
But while these two cases share some common ground, they
represent two entirely distinct principles. Totten represents a
complete ban on litigation that involves clandestine
government contracts, or spy contracts.11 The ―Totten ban‖
therefore operates to cut off any litigation on a spy contract on
the pleadings.12 It is similar to justiciability doctrines that
prevent the courts from hearing whole categories of cases,
except that the Totten ban does not have the same
constitutional pedigree.
Reynolds, in contrast, is a common law evidentiary
privilege. The ―Reynolds privilege‖ therefore protects evidence
that contains a state secret.13 Unlike the Totten ban, it need
not end the case, unless an essential claim or defense hinges
only on protected evidence and cannot be established with
alternative, non-privileged evidence.14
This section includes a discussion of the Totten ban and the
Reynolds privilege, starting with Totten and Reynolds
themselves.
The section concludes by highlighting the
differences between the Totten ban and the Reynolds privilege,
drawing on the Supreme Court‘s most recent foray into the
area in Tenet v. Doe.15
A. The Totten Ban
Totten brought a claim against the United States on behalf
of his intestate, William A. Lloyd, for breach of contract.16
Lloyd contracted with President Lincoln in July 1861 to
9. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
10. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
11. See generally Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2005) (noting the impact
of the Totten bar and its effect on the claim itself).
12. Id.
13. See generally Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10-11.
14. See generally Tenet, 544 U.S. at 8-9 (explaining the Reynolds
evidentiary privilege).
15. 544 U.S. 1 (2005).
16. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 105 (1875).
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―proceed South and ascertain the number of troops stationed at
different points in the insurrectionary States, procure plans of
forts and fortifications, and gain such other information as
might be beneficial to the Government of the United States.‖17
Lloyd was Lincoln‘s spy, and the President agreed to pay him
two hundred dollars per month for his services.18
Lloyd satisfied his part of the contract, but, after the war,
the Government only reimbursed him for expenses.19 It did not
pay him the two hundred dollars per month it owed for his
services.20 Nevertheless, the Court of Claims ruled against
Totten and dismissed the case, holding that the President
lacked authority to bind the United States to the contract in
the first place.21
The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, but for different
reasons.22 In contrast to the Court of Claims, the Supreme
Court ruled unequivocally that the President had authority as
commander-in-chief to bind the United States to a spy contract
during the war.23 But the Court also ruled that the contract
itself was a secret.24 The Court‘s language is worth quoting at
length:
The service stipulated by the contract was a
secret service; the information sought was to be
obtained clandestinely, and was to be
communicated privately; the employment and
the service were to be equally concealed. Both
employer and agent must have understood that
the lips of the other were to be for ever sealed
respecting the relation of either to the matter.
This condition of the engagement was implied
from the nature of the employment, and is
implied in all secret employments of the
government in time of war, or upon matters
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 106.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 106-07.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 106-07.
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affecting our foreign relations, where a disclosure
of the service might compromise or embarrass
our government in its public duties, or endanger
the person or injure the character of the agent.25
The Court ruled that the secrecy of the contract meant that
it could not be litigated.26 The Court cited ―public policy‖ to
justify its holding and explained that if government spy
contracts could be litigated, the whole secret service operation
might be exposed, threatening national security and effectively
shutting down the service.27 In addition, any secret agent, or,
presumably, even any putative secret agent, could unilaterally
threaten the entire service by exposing it in any run-of-themill, real or imagined, employment dispute.28 The Court later
called this threat ―graymail.‖29 Moreover, any suit on a secret
contract would itself breach that contract, because it would
reveal the very secret that the contract was meant to
preserve.30
The Court dismissed Totten‘s case on these public policy
considerations alone, without citing a single case or any other
legal authority in support of its ruling.31 In closing dicta,
however, the Court suggested a more concrete basis for its
decision by aligning this new principle with common law
privileges respecting communications between clergy and
parishioner, husband and wife, client and counsel, and patient
and doctor.32
The Court determined that this type of
communication involves ―matters which the law itself regards
as confidential;‖ a suit that requires this type of disclosure
cannot be maintained.33

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 106.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 106-07.
Id.
Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 11 (2005).
Totten, 92 U.S. at 107.
Id. at 106-07.
Id. at 107.
Id.
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B. The Reynolds Privilege
Reynolds involved a negligence claim against the Federal
Government by widows of civilians killed in the crash of an Air
Force B-29.34 The plaintiffs moved during discovery for an
order requiring production of the Air Force‘s official accident
report.35 The Government opposed the motion, arguing that
the report was privileged based on an ill-defined claim that the
proceedings of investigatory boards of the armed services
should be categorically protected from disclosure.36 The district
court rejected the Government‘s arguments, suggesting that
the ―well-recognized common-law privilege protecting state
secrets‖ might have worked better.37
The Government took the hint, and the Secretary of the
Air Force filed a formal claim of the state secrets privilege with
the district court on August 9, 1950.38 The district judge
reviewed the report in camera ―so that he might determine
whether all or any part of the documents contain, to use the
words of his order, ‗matters of a confidential nature, discovery
of which would violate the Government‘s privilege against
disclosure of matters involving the national or public
interest.‘‖39 The district judge ordered the Government to
produce the report, but the Government declined.40 The judge
issued an order ―that the facts in plaintiffs‘ favor on the issue of
negligence be taken as established and prohibiting the
defendant from introducing evidence to controvert those
facts.‖41 The court then held a hearing on damages and

34. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1953). See also LOUIS
FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL
POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE (2006); BARRY SIEGEL, CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
(2008).
35. Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468, 469 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aff’d
sub nom. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345
U.S. 1 (1953).
36. Id. at 472.
37. Id. at 471-72.
38. See Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 990 (3d Cir. 1951), aff’g
Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1950), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1
(1953).
39. Id. at 996.
40. Id. at 990.
41. Id. at 991.
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entered judgment for the plaintiffs.42
The Government appealed, arguing that ―it is within the
sole province of the Secretary of the Air Force to determine
whether any privileged material is contained in the documents
and that his determination of this question must be accepted
by the district court without any independent consideration of
the matter by it.‖43 The Third Circuit flatly rejected this claim
with prescient language:
On the contrary we are satisfied that a claim of
privilege against disclosing evidence relevant to
the issues in a pending law suit involves a
justiciable question, traditionally within the
competence of the courts, which is to be
determined in accordance with the appropriate
rules of evidence, upon the submission of the
documents in question to the judge for his
examination in camera. Such examination must
obviously be ex parte and in camera if the
privilege is not to be lost in its assertion. But to
hold that the head of an executive department of
the Government in a suit to which the United
States is a party may conclusively determine the
Government‘s claim of privilege is to abdicate the
judicial function and permit the executive branch
of the Government to infringe the independent
province of the judiciary as laid down by the
Constitution.44
In short, the state secrets privilege was an evidentiary
privilege to be invoked against evidence, not an entire case,
with meaningful judicial oversight.
The Supreme Court in Reynolds affirmed this principle,
even as it overturned the lower courts on the application of the
privilege in the case.45 Thus, the Court referenced several
cases, including Totten, for the proposition that the ―privilege
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 996-97.
Id. at 997 (citations omitted).
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953).
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against revealing military secrets . . . [was] well established in
the law of evidence‖46 and looked to ―an analogous privilege,
the privilege against self-incrimination,‖ for guidance on its
application.47 Importantly, nothing in the decision suggested
that the privilege was rooted in the Constitution or separationof-powers considerations. If anything, such considerations cut
the other way. In calibrating the appropriate level of judicial
oversight, the Court wrote that ―[j]udicial control over the
evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of
executive officers.‖48
The Court used a two-step process to evaluate the formal
claim of the privilege by the Secretary of the Air Force
―indicating a reasonable possibility that [state] secrets were
involved.‖49 In the first step, the Court determined how
thoroughly to evaluate the claim, which is based upon the
plaintiff‘s need for information in pursuing his or her case.50
―In each case, the showing of necessity which is made will
determine how far the court should probe in satisfying itself
that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate.‖51
A significant need—for example, a case where a plaintiff‘s
claim would fail without the material—results in a significant
review, including an in camera, ex parte review of the material.
Moreover, courts should apply great scrutiny: ―[w]here there is
a strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not
be lightly accepted.‖52 In contrast, a lesser need—for example,
a case where a plaintiff might rely on non-privileged material—
results in a deferential review of the claim.53
As to the first step, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs‘ need
was ―dubious,‖ because they failed to pursue the underlying
information about the crash from an alternative and available
non-privileged source, the surviving crew members.54 As a
result, the Court ruled that it could evaluate the privilege
46. Id. at 6-7.
47. Id. at 8.
48. Id. at 9-10.
49. Id. at 11.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 11.
53. See id. (―A fortiori, where necessity is dubious, a formal claim of
privilege, made under the circumstances of this case, will have to prevail.‖).
54. Id.
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based upon a deferential review of the Secretary‘s claim alone,
and not based upon an in camera examination of the report
itself.55
In the second step, after evaluating the claim, the Court
denied access to the report. At this stage, the Court engaged in
no balancing.
Instead, the successful invocation of the
privilege was absolute. ―[E]ven the most compelling necessity
cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately
satisfied that military secrets are at stake.‖56 Presumably, as
with any other evidentiary privilege, an unsuccessful
invocation would have resulted in an order to produce the
evidence.
The Court‘s denial alone, however, did not end the case.
The Court remanded the case, permitting it, at least
theoretically, to proceed on any available non-privileged
evidence.57
C. The Totten Ban and the Reynolds Privilege in Contrast
The Court did not seriously address the relationship
between the Totten bar and the Reynolds privilege until 2005,
when it dismissed another spy case.58 In Tenet v. Doe, two
foreign nationals sued the director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (―CIA‖) and the United States for failure to satisfy their
part of the plaintiffs‘ contract for espionage services during the
Cold War, a case that seemed very much like Totten.59 Unlike
Totten, however, the plaintiffs in Tenet did not merely allege
breach of contract.
Instead, they alleged that the
Government‘s failure to meet an obligation to provide them
with continued financial support violated their equal protection
and due process rights.60
The lower courts ruled that this difference allowed the
plaintiffs to dodge the Totten bar. They limited Totten to its
most narrow facts—a breach of contract claim on a spy
contract—and ruled that Totten, therefore, did not bar the
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005).
Id. at 1.
Id. at 5.
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plaintiffs‘ constitutional claims.61 The Ninth Circuit held that
Reynolds recast the Totten bar as merely an early and extreme
version of the Reynolds privilege.62 Both lower courts ruled
that the Federal Government could exclude evidence based on
the Reynolds state secrets privilege, but that Totten did not bar
the suit entirely.63
The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the case based
on a rote application of the Totten bar. The Court ruled that
the lower courts read Totten too narrowly—that by its plain
terms Totten applies to all ―lawsuits premised on alleged
espionage agreements.‖64 Citing Reynolds itself, the Court
wrote:
―[W]here the very subject matter of the action, a
contract to perform espionage, was a matter of
state secret,‖ we declared that such a case was to
be ―dismissed on the pleadings without ever
reaching the question of evidence, since it was so
obvious that the action should never prevail over
the privilege.‖65
The Supreme Court affirmed that Totten applied only to cases
involving spy agreements, but it also held that Totten applied
to any case involving spy agreements, no matter the cause of
action.66
61. Tenet v. Doe, 329 F.3d 1135, 1145-55 (9th Cir. 2003); Doe v. Tenet,
99 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1289-94 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
62. See Tenet, 329 F.3d at 1152-53.
63. Id. at 1145-55; Tenet, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1289-94.
64. Tenet, 544 U.S. at 9.
65. Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1953)
(citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875)).
66. The Court had previously affirmed the ―more sweeping holding in
Totten.‖ Tenet, 544 U.S. at 9 (citing Weinberger v. Catholic Action of
Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981)). The Court in Weinberger,
however, merely quoted and cited Totten as support, and only by analogy, for
its dicta that the Navy‘s full compliance with portions of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (―NEPA‖), Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852,
was ―beyond judicial scrutiny.‖ Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 146. Ultimately, the
Court held that whether or not the Navy has complied with NEPA ―to the
fullest extent possible‖ was beyond judicial review. Id. at 142. In other
circumstances, the Court has stated that ―public policy forbids the
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would
inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as
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At the same time, the Court drew a clear line between
Totten and Reynolds. Totten, it ruled, established a complete
bar to litigation.67 Reynolds, in contrast, established an
evidentiary privilege.68 In explaining the difference, the Court
wrote, ―[t]he [Reynolds] state secrets privilege and the more
frequent use of in camera judicial proceedings simply cannot
provide the absolute protection we found necessary in
enunciating the Totten rule.‖69
The state secrets privilege announced in Reynolds, to be
sure, drew support from Totten, ―[b]ut that in no way signaled
[the Court‘s] retreat from Totten‘s broader holding that
lawsuits premised on alleged espionage agreements are
altogether forbidden.‖70
Thus Tenet affirmed what Totten and Reynolds previously
held and drew a sharp line between them. The Totten bar
applies to cases involving a government spy contract; it
prevents the entire case from going forward. In contrast, the
Reynolds evidentiary privilege applies to evidence; it may
protect evidence that contains state secrets, but it does not
prevent a plaintiff‘s case from proceeding on the basis of
alternative, non-privileged evidence.
II. The State Secrets Privilege: Two Variations
Courts have taken the Totten ban and the Reynolds
privilege in different, and sometimes surprising, directions.
But at the end of the day, the cases applying these doctrines
fall into two categories. In the first—the ―Reynolds cases‖—
courts, following Reynolds, treat the state secrets privilege as a
common law evidentiary privilege. These cases consider an
assertion of the privilege on evidence, usually in discovery, and
thoughtfully assess whether and how the case might proceed
without any privileged evidence.
confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be
violated.‖ Totten, 92 U.S. at 107. The Court confronted a similar situation in
Tenet. Weinberger thus reaffirms Totten, but nothing in Weinberger suggests
that the Totten bar applies to cases other than those involving spy contracts.
67. Tenet, 544 U.S. at 7-11.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 11.
70. Id. at 9.
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In the second category—the ―Totten cases‖—courts,
trending more toward Totten, often treat the state secrets
privilege more as a rule of justiciability. The courts in these
cases are quicker to dismiss based only on the Government‘s
assertion that the very subject matter of the case is a state
secret.
This section discusses both categories in some detail in
order to provide the background for assessing the shifts in the
state secrets privilege in the post-9/11 cases.
A. The Reynolds Cases
The Reynolds cases tend to treat the state secrets privilege
as a common law evidentiary privilege, following Reynolds
itself.71 In other words, the courts in these cases consider state
secrets claims on the evidence, usually during discovery, and
determine whether the evidence contains state secrets. If it
does, the courts then determine whether and how to proceed
without the privileged evidence. These courts thus treat the
state secrets privilege like any other evidentiary privilege.
The characteristics of these cases include: treating the
privilege as evidentiary, rather than constitutional; serious
considerations of a plaintiff‘s need for the information;
meaningful scrutiny of the Government‘s claim of privilege,
often including in camera review of the material sought to be
protected, not just a review of the supporting affidavit; and
serious consideration of alternative non-privileged sources for
the information. These cases exhibit such characteristics even
when the Government moves to dismiss, or for summary
judgment on the pleadings, because, for example, the plaintiff
cannot establish standing or a prima facie case without the
privileged evidence.
These characteristics are illustrated in a series of cases out
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. In Ellsberg v. Mitchell, the court ruled that
the district court had properly protected certain evidence from
71. See generally United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); In re
Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007); In re United States, 872 F.2d 472
(D.C. Cir. 1989); Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Ellsberg v.
Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Halkin v. Helms (Halkin II), 690 F.2d
977 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Halkin v. Helms (Halkin I), 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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discovery after it reviewed the underlying material and various
affidavits supporting the Government‘s assertion of the
privilege.72 But in so ruling, the court also offered its own
reasons for close judicial examination of assertions of the
privilege:
The head of an executive department can
appraise the public interest of secrecy as well (or
perhaps in some cases better) than the judge, but
his official habit and leaning tend to sway him
toward a minimizing of the interest of the
individual. Under the normal administrative
routine the question will come to him with
recommendations from cautious subordinates
against disclosure and in the press of business
the chief is likely to approve the recommendation
about such a seemingly minor matter without
much independent consideration. . . . Thus, to
ensure that the state secrets privilege is asserted
no more frequently and sweepingly than
necessary, it is essential that the courts continue
critically to examine instances of its invocation.73
Thus the court should closely examine an assertion of the state
secrets privilege, even as it accords ―considerable deference‖74
to the executive and judges only whether the Government has
established a ―reasonable danger‖75 that disclosure will result
in harm. The court wrote that, in determining whether and
how to review materials sought to be protected, it should
consider both the litigant‘s need for the material76 and ―the
government‘s allegations of danger to national security in the
context of all the circumstances surrounding the case.‖77
Both the district court and the D.C. Circuit closely
scrutinized the Government‘s assertions of the state secrets
privilege. They both reviewed in camera the underlying
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 59.
Id. at 58 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)).
Id. at 58.
Id. at 59.
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material regarding the defendant‘s electronic surveillance of
the plaintiffs, as well as the affidavits supporting the claims of
privilege. The D.C. Circuit upheld the district court‘s decision
with regard to most of the Government‘s assertions of the
privilege. But it overruled the district court on one key aspect:
it closely examined the Government‘s assertions and ruled that
the Government insufficiently justified—and thus the lower
court improperly granted—protection of key evidence for the
plaintiffs, i.e., the names of Attorneys General who authorized
the surveillance.78
Both courts also treated the privilege as an evidentiary
privilege, not a constitutional principle that would mandate
dismissal. To be sure, this treatment squared with the
procedural posture of the case: the Government asserted the
privilege largely in the context of discovery, not as a basis to
dismiss the case on the pleadings.79 Even so, the circuit court
could not have been clearer that the privilege was categorically
evidentiary.80 The court held that ―the uniform rule governing
civil suits brought by private parties is that the effect of
invocation of a state secrets privilege is simply to remove from
the case the material in question.‖81 The Ellsberg court ruled
that this general principle applied to the case; therefore,
dismissal of any portion of the suit would be appropriate ―only
if the plaintiffs were manifestly unable to make out a prima
facie case without the requested information.‖82
Ellsberg thus holds that where a plaintiff‘s need for the
material is strong, courts should closely scrutinize assertions of
executive privilege through in camera examinations of
supporting affidavits, as well as the underlying material the
78. Id. at 59-60. The court went one step further in its scrutiny and
ruled that, where the plaintiffs made a compelling showing of need for the
information, ―the trial judge should insist . . . that the formal claim of
privilege be made on the public record,‖ id. at 63 (emphasis added), as well as
a public defense of the assertion of privilege, or else an explanation why such
a public defense would endanger national security. Id. at 63-64.
79. Id. at 52-56.
80. Id. at 65.
81. Id. The court wrote that this ―uniform rule‖ applied in all but one
special situation: where the Government asserts the privilege against
material in a plaintiff‘s possession in a case between two private litigants.
Id. at 58 (citing Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th
Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam)).
82. Id. at 65.
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party is seeking to protect.83 In cases of compelling need,
courts should also require the Government to defend its claim
of privilege publicly.84 Therefore, if the court grants the
privilege, the case will move forward without the protected
material. Dismissal of any claim is only appropriate if the
protected material is essential to the claim.
The Ellsberg court articulated these principles in a case
where the Government asserted the state secrets claim largely
in discovery, but the D.C. Circuit has affirmed these principles
in a line of cases where the Government moved for complete
dismissal on the pleadings.85 As in Ellsberg, the courts in these
cases treated the privilege as an evidentiary privilege and
carefully examined the Government‘s claim of privilege.86
Because these cases involved complete dismissal, the courts
also looked carefully at alternative, non-privileged sources of
information that would permit the plaintiffs‘ claims to go
forward.87
Thus, in Halkin v. Helms (―Halkin I‖), the court ruled on
the Government‘s assertion of the state secrets privilege in
response to the plaintiffs‘ claims that the National Security
Agency (―NSA‖) conducted warrantless interceptions of their
international wire and telephone communications in violation
of their constitutional and statutory rights.88 The Government
filed a motion to dismiss based upon the formal claim of the
state secrets privilege by the Secretary of Defense.89 The
Secretary argued that discovery or even a responsive pleading
would necessarily disclose the identity of those targeted, the
nature of the intercepted communications, and the methods of
interception—all of which are state secrets.90
The court ruled in favor of the Government and even
granted the privilege with respect to one NSA program for

83. Id. at 69.
84. Id. at 63-64 & n.53.
85. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007); In re
United States, 872 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Halkin I, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
86. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 85.
87. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 85.
88. Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 11.
89. Id. at 4.
90. Id. at 8.
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which the district court denied the privilege.91 In doing so,
however, it carefully probed the Government‘s claim based on
the plaintiffs‘ extraordinary need: the plaintiffs‘ case depended
on the information in the evidence that the defense was
seeking to protect.92 The court thus ruled that the district
court properly examined in camera three government affidavits
and the testimony of the NSA deputy director before ruling on
the privilege.93 Moreover, it examined available non-privileged
alternatives to the privileged evidence and, only after careful
review, ruled that alternatives would not allow the plaintiffs to
establish a prima facie case.94
The court remanded the case, permitting it to go forward
on other evidence and other claims. When the case reached the
D.C. Circuit again, in Halkin II, the Government claimed the
privilege in discovery.95 But in Halkin II, the D.C. Circuit held
that the trial judge appropriately upheld the privilege on the
basis of two affidavits of the director of the CIA.96 After
carefully reviewing the affidavits and exhaustively considering
the plaintiffs‘ arguments (including arguments about specific
measures the court should use to examine the Government‘s
91. Id. at 10-11.
92. Id. at 9. The court wrote:
In most cases [the Secretary‘s affidavit] would be sufficient
to sustain the claim of privilege. Here, however, plaintiffs‘
suit depends upon the discovery of this information.
Because it is the showing of necessity that determines how
deeply the court must probe to satisfy itself of the validity of
the claim the court below examined the in camera affidavits
and testimony. We think this was proper. Moreover, we
have reviewed the in camera materials ourselves and they
reinforce our conclusion from the open affidavits that the
state secrets claim must be upheld.
Id. (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 7.
94. Id. at 9. The full D.C. Circuit denied en banc review. Id. at 11. Two
judges, Judge Bazelon and Chief Judge Wright, were in favor of en banc
review. In a statement, written by Judge Bazelon and joined by Chief Judge
Wright, they argued that the court did not go far enough in crediting the
plaintiffs‘ ―weighty Fourth Amendment interests‖ and the extent to which
one of the surveillance programs had previously been made public. Id. at 1118 (Bazelon, J., statement as to why he voted for rehearing en banc).
95. Halkin II, 690 F.2d 977, 989-90 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
96. Id. at 991.
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claim), the court ruled that it need go no further in scrutinizing
the Government‘s claim of privilege.97 The court wrote that it
was ―self-evident that the disclosures sought here pose[d] a
‗reasonable danger‘ to the diplomatic and military interests of
the United States.‖98 As a result, the court ruled that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to establish their claim that they
were targets of government surveillance.99
The D.C. Circuit approached the state secrets privilege
similarly in Molerio v. FBI.100 In Molerio, the plaintiff claimed
that the FBI refused to hire him as a special agent because of
his father‘s political activities—an alleged violation of his
After answering
statutory and constitutional rights.101
portions of the complaint and providing some discovery, the
Government asserted the state secrets privilege and moved for
complete dismissal, claiming that it could not litigate the case
without revealing secret information.102
In an opinion authored by then-Judge Antonin Scalia, the
court first ruled that the Government had satisfied the
procedural requirements of the state secrets privilege.103 The
court specifically noted that the Government‘s motion to
dismiss would be, and had been, treated as a motion for
summary judgment.104 The court‘s ruling is more consistent
with the notion that the state secrets privilege is an
evidentiary privilege, not an absolute bar to litigation. The
court upheld the trial court‘s ruling that the state secrets
privilege protected the Government‘s reasons for not hiring the
plaintiff, based on an in camera review of affidavits of the
acting attorney general and the assistant director in charge of
the Intelligence Division.105 But before upholding summary
judgment, the court conducted a detailed review of the
alternative, non-privileged evidence that might allow the
97. Id. at 991-97.
98. Id. at 993.
99. Id. at 998.
100. 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
101. Id. at 818-19.
102. Id. at 819.
103. Id. at 821. The procedural requirements were at issue because the
plaintiff claimed that the acting attorney general did not review all the
relevant underlying material, including his father‘s FBI file. Id.
104. Id. at 820.
105. Id. at 822.
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plaintiff to establish his case.106 The court ultimately ruled
that the evidence for each claim was insufficient.107
In In re United States, the Government moved for complete
dismissal of a suit by a plaintiff claiming that FBI surveillance
and political action programs caused injuries to her and her
deceased spouse.108 Both the district court and the court of
appeals, on mandamus review, rejected the claim and allowed
the suit to go forward.109 The D.C. Circuit ―carefully reviewed‖
the Government‘s supporting affidavit and rejected the
Government‘s claim of privilege, writing that ―[w]e share the
district court‘s confidence that it can police the litigation so as
not to compromise national security.‖110 The fact that the
plaintiff already received much of the sought-after information
through the Freedom of Information Act (―FOIA‖) bolstered the
court‘s decision to allow the case to proceed, because the
plaintiff possessed, through FOIA, an alternative, nonprivileged source of the information.111 The court noted that
the Government‘s motion was extraordinary and explained that
the ―[d]ismissal of a suit, and the consequent denial of a forum
106. Id. at 822-25.
107. Id. In a passage indicative of the D.C. Circuit‘s balanced approach
to the state secrets privilege, the court wrote:
It seems to us, however, that the effect of our determination
with regard to the state secrets privilege is to prevent this
issue from proceeding. As noted earlier, we honored the
invocation of that privilege because we satisfied ourselves
that the in camera affidavit set forth the genuine reason . . .
[that it] could not be disclosed without risking impairment
of the national security. As a result of that necessary
process, the court knows that the reason Daniel Molerio was
not hired had nothing to do with [his father‘s] assertion of
First Amendment rights. Although there may be enough
circumstantial evidence to permit a jury to come to that
erroneous conclusion, it would be a mockery of justice for
the court – knowing the erroneousness – to participate in
that exercise. . . . Here . . . we know that further activity in
this case would involve an attempt, however well
intentioned, to convince the jury of a falsehood.
Id. at 825.
108. 872 F.2d 472, 473-74 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
109. Id. at 474.
110. Id. at 480.
111. Id. at 478-79.
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without giving the plaintiff her day in court [was]
draconian.‖112 Once again, the court closely examined the
Government‘s claim and treated state secrets as an evidentiary
privilege.
Most recently, the D.C. Circuit in In re Sealed Case upheld
the Government‘s successful assertion of the state secrets
privilege, but permitted the case to proceed on the basis of
alternative, non-privileged evidence.113 An employee of the
Drug Enforcement Agency (―DEA‖) brought a claim against a
State Department official and a federal agent affiliated with
the CIA for tapping and recording his telephone conversations
in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.114 In response to
the plaintiff‘s allegations, the Government prepared two
inspector general reports.115 Subsequently, the Government
moved to intervene and asserted the privilege with respect to
portions of those reports.116
After reviewing both the
supporting affidavits and the underlying reports, the district
court upheld the privilege and dismissed the entire case.117
The court cited ―three independent grounds: (1) The plaintiff
cannot make out a prima facie case absent the protected
material; (2) the state secrets privilege deprives the defendants
of information required in their defense; and (3) the subject
matter of the plaintiff‘s complaint is a state secret.‖118
The D.C. Circuit reviewed the affidavits and reports and
upheld the Government‘s claim of privilege.119
But it
overturned the district court‘s dismissal as to one of the two
defendants.120 In an analysis that sums up the D.C. Circuit‘s
approach to state secrets, the court addressed each ground for
dismissal separately.121
First, the court ruled that even without the privileged
portions of the reports the plaintiff may be able to establish his

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 477.
494 F.3d 139, 154 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 142.
Id.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 144-54.
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prima facie case based on the unprotected portions of the
reports and other non-privileged evidence.122 Importantly, the
court analyzed the alternative, non-privileged evidence and its
potential effects on the plaintiff‘s claim in some detail.123 The
court noted that the CIA director‘s affidavit itself suggested
that the unprotected portions of the reports could be segregated
without revealing information that would harm national
Moreover, the plaintiff possessed declassified
security.124
portions of a cable that quoted his telephone conversation, he
had evidence of ―a suspicious entry into his apartment,‖125 and
he could call government officers to testify as to non-privileged
matters relevant to his claims.126 This evidence was indirect, to
be sure, but the court ruled that it was sufficient to withstand
the Government‘s motion to dismiss the entire case with
respect to one of the two defendants.127
Second, the court ruled that the Government‘s defense,
which hinged on protected information, was insufficiently
defined and too obscure to permit the court to dismiss the
entire case.128 The court distinguished Molerio, in which the
privileged material conclusively demonstrated to the court that
the Government ―could not have committed the alleged acts,‖129
and suggested that the Government‘s defense here was murky
and uncertain.130 The court used language that underscored
two characteristics of the D.C. Circuit‘s approach to state
secrets—treating state secrets as an evidentiary privilege, and
seriously considering the plaintiff‘s need for the information.
After a careful examination of the Government‘s claims and its
treatment of state secrets as an evidentiary privilege, the court
wrote:
Under this court‘s precedent, a claim of state
secrets privilege results in ―no consequences save
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 145-48.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 145-46.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 148-51.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 148-51.
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those resulting from the loss of the evidence,‖
including ―no alteration of pertinent substantive
or procedural rules.‖ . . . Just as ―[i]t would be
manifestly unfair to permit a presumption of
[unconstitutional conduct] to run against‖ the
defendant when the privilege is invoked . . . it
would be manifestly unfair to a plaintiff to
impose a presumption that the defendant has a
valid defense that is obscured by the privilege.
There is no support for such a presumption
among the other evidentiary privileges because a
presumption would invariably shift the burdens
of proof, something the courts may not do under
the auspices of privilege.131
The court emphasized that ―[i]t bears remembering that the
loss of evidence to the state secrets privilege is to be treated
like the loss of evidence when ‗a witness ha[s] died.‘‖132
Next, in language that underscores the D.C. Circuit‘s
consideration of the plaintiff‘s interests, the court wrote:
In suggesting that a defendant‘s interests require
dismissing actions because of plausible but not
demonstrably valid defenses, our colleague
ignores how this would abridge the rights of
plaintiffs and discounts how the fundamental
rights of defendants are protected by dismissing
cases when privilege obscures a valid defense
that is likely to cause the trier of fact to reach an
erroneous conclusion . . . or upon a legitimate
claim of immunity.133
Finally, the court declined to adopt the Government‘s
position that ―the very subject matter of the action . . . [is] a
matter of state secret,‖134 requiring dismissal on the complaint
131.
132.
1983)).
133.
134.
(1953)).

Id. at 149-50 (citations omitted).
Id. at 151 (quoting Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 64 (D.C. Cir.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 151 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11
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alone.135 The court distinguished Totten and Doe, limiting
those cases to spy agreements and writing that this case
involved no such secret agreement with the United States.136
The court also recognized the significant interests of the
plaintiff by quoting In re United States—specifically, that
complete dismissal deprives the plaintiff of ―her day in court‖
and ―is indeed draconian.‖137 Finally, the court suggested that
Reynolds provided no basis for complete dismissal and affirmed
that case as supporting an evidentiary privilege, noting that
―[i]n Reynolds itself, at the height of the Cold War, the
Supreme Court remanded the FTCA [Federal Tort Claims Act]
case to proceed without the privileged materials.‖138
The court seemed to acknowledge that under different
circumstances the Government‘s claim might be valid. The
court distinguished El-Masri,139 in which the Fourth Circuit
dismissed the complaint upon the Government‘s claim that the
very subject matter of the litigation was a state secret.140 The
D.C. Circuit Court wrote that El-Masri dealt with the legality
of a secret government program.141 Such a program is far
different than the declassified evidence in In re Sealed Case
that might form the basis of the plaintiff‘s prima facie case. By
implication, if In re Sealed Case involved a secret government
program like the program in El-Masri, the court might well
have dismissed the complaint based on the secrecy of the very
subject matter of the suit. Supporting this conclusion, the
court, in dicta, wrote that ―[i]f the district court determines
135. Id. at 151-54.
136. Id. at 151.
137. Id. at 151 (quoting In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir.
1989)).
138. Id.
139. 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir.
2007).
140. In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 152-53. The court also distinguished
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1985) and
Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(per curiam). In those cases, however, the Fourth Circuit treated state
secrets as an evidentiary privilege, similar to the approaches in Halkin I and
Halkin II. Fitzgerald and Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. did not involve the same
type of sweeping categorical claim that the Government made in In re Sealed
Case. Thus the court‘s distinction between those cases and In re Sealed Case
did not provide any insight into whether the D.C. Circuit might recognize the
Government‘s claim in another case.
141. In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 152-53.
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that the subject matter of a case is so sensitive that there is no
way it can be litigated without risking national secrets, then
the case must be dismissed.‖142
But we must read this dictum and the court‘s cursory
treatment of El-Masri alongside its earlier language on Totten,
Reynolds, and complete dismissals of cases involving state
secrets. Taken together, within the larger context of the
opinion, the court cannot be understood as endorsing the
broader claim that a case might be dismissed because its very
subject matter is a state secret. In the D.C. Circuit and the
Reynolds cases, unlike the Totten cases, this question is, at
most, open.
For all these reasons, the Reynolds cases reject the
Government‘s motion to dismiss on the basis of the ―very
subject matter of [the] action,‖143 and allow the case to proceed
on alternative, non-privileged evidence.
Thus the Reynolds cases treat the state secrets doctrine as
a common law evidentiary privilege. The courts in these cases
carefully consider the plaintiff‘s need for the evidence, they
determine how deeply to probe into the Government‘s claim of
privilege, and they carefully determine whether and how to
proceed in the case without any privileged evidence. They
exhibit these characteristics even when dismissing an action
because the privilege prevents a plaintiff from establishing a
prima facie case. In short, they treat the state secrets privilege
as they would treat any other evidentiary privilege.
For the courts in the Totten line of cases, the state secrets
privilege is much more.
B. The Totten Cases
In contrast to the Reynolds cases, the Totten cases tend to
treat the state secrets privilege more like a justiciability
doctrine.144 In other words, the courts in the Totten cases are
142. Id. at 153.
143. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953).
144. See generally Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875); Sterling
v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2005); Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th
Cir. 1998); Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1995); Bareford v.
Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1992), vacated in part, No. 912432, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25805 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 1992); Fitzgerald v.
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quicker to dismiss a case because its very subject matter is a
state secret.
This approach prevents a plaintiff from
establishing a case on other, non-privileged grounds. It means
that whole categories of cases are inappropriate for judicial
review.
The characteristics of these cases include little or no
consideration of the plaintiff‘s need for the evidence; great
deference to the Government in its assertion of the privilege;
little consideration of whether and how to proceed without
privileged evidence; and, of course, complete dismissal anytime
the very subject matter of the case is a state secret.
Thus in Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, an en banc
Fourth Circuit reversed a three-judge panel of the Fourth
Circuit and upheld the district court‘s summary dismissal of
the plaintiff‘s claims upon the Government‘s assertion of the
state secrets privilege.145 In that case, the plaintiff, a defense
contractor, alleged that a Navy employee wrongfully interfered
with its prospective contract with the Navy.146 In an opinion
characteristic of the D.C. Circuit‘s approach to state secrets, a
three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded
the district court‘s dismissal.147 The appellate court held that
dismissal was not justified even if the very subject matter of
the suit were a state secret or when the state secrets doctrine
worked to deprive the defendant of a valid defense.148 It also
held that the plaintiff could attempt to use alternative, nonprivileged evidence to establish its claim.149
The full Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, in a per curiam
opinion running all of five paragraphs with no case citations,
affirmed the district court‘s dismissal.150 After examining the
affidavit of the Secretary of the Navy, the court wrote that ―any
attempt on the part of the plaintiff to establish a prima facie
case would so threaten disclosure of state secrets that the
overriding interest of the United States and the preservation of
Penthouse Int‘l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1985); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc.
v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam).
145. Farnsworth Cannon, Inc., 635 F.2d at 281.
146. Id. at 268-70.
147. Id. at 276.
148. Id. at 269-73.
149. Id. at 273-75.
150. Id. at 281.
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its state secrets precludes any further attempt to pursue this
litigation.‖151 The court apparently deferred completely to the
Government, without a hint of consideration of alternative,
non-privileged evidence or the plaintiff‘s interest in the case.152
Four judges, including two on the original panel, dissented.153
Citing Farnsworth Cannon, the Fourth Circuit, in
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse International, Ltd., again affirmed a
district court‘s dismissal of a plaintiff‘s claim based on the
Government‘s assertion of the state secrets privilege.154 In
Fitzgerald, the plaintiff claimed that a publisher libelously
charged the plaintiff with espionage, suggesting that the
plaintiff attempted to profit from his work on the Government‘s
secret program involving the use of animals for military and
intelligence purposes.155 When the plaintiff sought to call a
witness that would testify that the plaintiff revealed only
unclassified information about the program, the Government
intervened, asserted the state secrets privilege, and moved to
dismiss the case.156 In support of its claim, the Government
produced an affidavit from the Secretary of the Navy, which
explained that ―public disclosure of the classified information
involved in this program could reasonably be expected to cause
grave damage to the national security,‖ and that ―it was
‗probable that classified information relating to the potential
military uses of marine mammals [would] be called for, either
directly or by a process of elimination,‘ if the case proceeded to
trial.‖157
The court upheld the privilege, and the district court‘s
dismissal, because ―the very subject of this litigation [was]
itself a state secret.‖158 It considered neither alternative, nonprivileged evidence that the plaintiff might use to establish his
claim nor the plaintiff‘s interest in the case. And it considered
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Judge Phillips and Judge Murnaghan, both of whom sat on the
original panel, dissented in separate opinions. Id. at 281-82 (Phillips, J.,
dissenting); id. at 282-83 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). Judges Winter and
Ervin joined Judge Phillips‘s dissent. Id. at 281-82 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
154. 776 F.2d 1236, 1244 (4th Cir. 1985).
155. Id. at 1237.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1242-43.
158. Id. at 1243.
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no method by which the district court might protect privileged
evidence while allowing the case to proceed. In short, the court
apparently deferred completely to the Secretary‘s claims
regarding the inability to proceed without disclosing secret
information.159 The court concluded by aligning the case with
Farnsworth Cannon and Totten, but cited no authority for this
novel alignment. Instead, the court declared that ―Totten,
Farnsworth Cannon and this case all fall within that narrow
category due to the centrality of the privileged material to the
very question upon which a decision must be rendered.‖160
In Bareford v. General Dynamics Corp., plaintiffs sued a
defense contractor, alleging that its defective weapons system
caused deaths and injuries of sailors in a missile attack.161 The
Federal Government intervened and alleged that the state
secrets privilege protected evidence critical to the plaintiffs‘
case and that the very subject of the action was a state
secret.162 The Government moved to dismiss the case on the
pleadings.163 After an in camera examination of the Navy‘s
official investigation and a supporting affidavit by an admiral,
the district court dismissed the case.164
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court‘s dismissal,
holding that the plaintiffs would be unable to prove their case
without the protected information and that the very subject
matter of the case was a state secret.165 The court held that
while the plaintiffs produced voluminous alternative, nonprivileged evidence, it was insufficient to establish their

159. Id.
160. Id. at 1244.
161. 973 F.2d 1138, 1140 (5th Cir. 1992), vacated in part, No. 91-2432,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25805 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 1992). The Bareford court
noted that Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.
1991) involved the same basic facts. Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1142 (stating that
the plaintiff‘s alternative evidence in Bareford is more than the ―dockside
rumor‖ in Zuckerbraun). The Second Circuit in Zuckerbraun used an
approach very much like the Fifth Circuit‘s approach in Bareford, except that
the Second Circuit was somewhat more cursory in its analysis, in part
because the plaintiffs in Zuckerbraun did not come forward with alternative,
non-privileged evidence to establish their claims. See generally Zuckerbraun
v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1991).
162. Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1140, 1145.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1145.
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claim.166 The court wrote,
Bareford has come forward with substantial
evidence from which a judge or jury might find
problems, or even wrongdoing, by General
Dynamics in its production and testing of the
Phalanx system. That alone will not establish a
prima facie case. Its claim of manufacturing and
design defects requires proof of what the Phalanx
system was intended to do and the ways in which
it fails to accomplish these goals. This question
cannot be resolved without access to detailed
data regarding ―the design, manufacture,
performance, functional characteristics, and
testing of these systems.‖ . . . Such an analysis of
the capabilities of an advanced Navy frigate‘s
defensive systems is the type of judicial
disclosure of state secrets the doctrine blocks.167
But even if the additional evidence might establish their claim,
the court ruled that ―any further attempt by the plaintiffs to
establish a prima facie case would threaten disclosure of
important state secrets.‖168 Moreover, even alternative, nonprivileged evidence would require acknowledgment by the
Government, thus revealing a state secret.169 In other words,
any litigation of the matter would reveal a state secret; or,
stated differently, the very subject matter of the case was a
state secret.170 The court affirmed the district court‘s dismissal
and declined to permit the case to go forward.
The Fifth Circuit in Bareford gave only cursory
consideration to the plaintiffs‘ alternative, non-privileged
evidence as an alternative basis for its claims. Moreover, it did
not even consider the plaintiffs‘ significant interests in
166. Id. at 1141.
167. Id. at 1142 (citation omitted).
168. Id. at 1143.
169. Id. at 1144.
170. Id. at 1143. The Bareford court wrote that ―[t]he state secret
doctrine justifies dismissal when privileged material is central ‗to the very
question upon which a decision must be rendered.‘‖ Id. (quoting Fitzgerald v.
Penthouse Int‘l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1244 (4th Cir. 1985)).
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pursuing the case.
Instead, the court disregarded the
plaintiffs‘ interests because the Government properly invoked
the privilege.171 Finally, the court ruled that the privilege
completely barred further litigation, in part because the very
subject matter of the action was a state secret.172
In Black v. United States, the Eighth Circuit similarly
dismissed a plaintiff‘s complaint on the pleadings based on the
Government‘s assertion of the state secrets privilege.173 In that
case, the plaintiff, an electrical engineer who worked on
military projects for various defense contractors, alleged that
the Government engaged in a ―campaign of harassment and
psychological attacks‖ against him in violation of his
constitutional rights and the Federal Tort Claims Act.174 The
Government asserted the state secrets privilege and moved to
dismiss the case on the amended complaint.175 The district
reviewed in camera two supporting government declarations
and granted the Government‘s motion, dismissing the case.176
The Eighth Circuit upheld the dismissal, ruling that the
plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case and that
continued litigation would risk revealing the privileged

171. Compare Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics, Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1144
(5th Cir. 1992), vacated in part, No. 91-2432, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25805
(5th Cir. Oct. 14, 1992) (―Plaintiffs argue that dismissal of their case was an
overly harsh remedy for the potential security risk posed by the trial of this
case. Dismissal is a harsh sanction. But the results are harsh in either
direction and the state secret doctrine finds the greater public good—
ultimately the less harsh remedy—to be dismissal.‖) with In re United States,
872 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (―Dismissal of a suit, and the consequent
denial of a forum without giving the plaintiff her day in court, however, is
indeed draconian.‖).
The Bareford approach seems to conflate or to confuse the two steps in
Reynolds. As we have seen, Reynolds first requires the court to use the
plaintiff‘s interest to calibrate the depth of its probe into the Government‘s
assertion of the privilege. Next, it requires the court to determine whether
and how to proceed with the case in light of the assertion of privilege. The
first step requires consideration of the plaintiff‘s interest, the second step
does not. The court in Bareford, however, neglects the plaintiffs‘ interests,
seemingly because it held that the Government appropriately invoked the
privilege.
172. Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1144.
173. 62 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1995).
174. Id. at 1116-17.
175. Id. at 1117.
176. Id.
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information.177 Like the Fifth Circuit in Bareford, and in sharp
contrast to the D.C. Circuit in the similar case In re Sealed
Case, the Eighth Circuit gave very little consideration to any
alternative, non-privileged evidence that might support the
plaintiff‘s claim. It gave no consideration to the plaintiff‘s
interest in the case and ruled that the privilege completely
barred further litigation of the matter, coming very close to
holding that the very subject matter of the case was a state
secret.178
The Ninth Circuit similarly upheld the state secrets
privilege in Kasza v. Browner, a case in which a plaintiff
challenged Air Force compliance with the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act.179 The Government asserted
the state secrets privilege in response to plaintiff‘s discovery
requests and moved for summary judgment on the ground that
the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case.180 After
reviewing supporting affidavits and documents in camera, the
district court concluded that the plaintiff could not establish
the claims and granted summary judgment.181
The Ninth Circuit affirmed for two independent reasons:
(1) because the privilege prevented the plaintiff from
establishing a prima facie case, and (2) because the very
subject matter of the plaintiff‘s suit was a state secret.182 Like
the Fourth Circuit in Farnsworth Cannon and Fitzgerald, the
Ninth Circuit in Kasza provided very little analysis for this
latter conclusion, although it did analyze other aspects of the
Government‘s claim. It merely cited Reynolds, Totten, Weston
v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,183 and Farnsworth Cannon in
support of its conclusion that the very subject matter of the
litigation was a state secret and required dismissal.184 Because
the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on this basis, it
declined to consider how the plaintiff might proceed on other,
177. Id. at 1118.
178. Id. at 1119 (―The information covered by the privilege is at the core
of Black‘s claims, and we are satisfied that the litigation cannot be tailored to
accommodate the loss of the privileged information.‖).
179. 133 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 1998).
180. Id. at 1163.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1170.
183. 881 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1989).
184. Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1165-67, 1170.
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non-privileged, evidence.185
In Tenenbaum v. Simonini, the Sixth Circuit upheld
summary judgment against a plaintiff who alleged that various
federal employees and the United States conducted a criminal
espionage investigation against him solely because he was
After reviewing the Government‘s supporting
Jewish.186
materials, the court ruled that the state secrets privilege
applied and completely barred further litigation.187 Moreover,
the court ruled that the Government could not defend itself
without revealing protected information.188 Just like the Fifth
Circuit in Bareford and the Eighth Circuit in Black, the Sixth
Circuit here gave no consideration to alternative, nonprivileged evidence; it gave no consideration to the plaintiffs‘
interest in the case; and it dismissed the case on summary
judgment because its very subject matter was a state secret.189
Finally, the Fourth Circuit in Sterling v. Tenet affirmed
the district court‘s dismissal of a plaintiff‘s claim that the CIA
discriminated against him because of his race.190 Like the
Ninth Circuit in Kasza, the Fourth Circuit held that the state
secrets privilege prevented the plaintiff from establishing a
prima facie case and that the very subject of the case was a
state secret.191 As to the latter holding, the Fourth Circuit
offered little analysis, simply resting its holding on Fitzgerald,
Farnsworth Cannon, and DTM Research, L.L.C v. AT&T
Corp.192
These Totten cases are thus characterized by little to no
consideration of the plaintiff‘s need for the information, great
judicial deference to executive claims of state secrets, and scant
consideration of whether or how a case might proceed in the
185. Id. at 1170.
186. 372 F.3d 776, 776 (6th Cir. 2004).
187. Id. at 777-78.
188. Id. at 777.
189. There appears to be no particular reason that the district court
granted summary judgment, and not a motion to dismiss, in this case. We
can, therefore, make no inferences about the court‘s treatment of the state
secrets doctrine based on its upholding the district court on summary
judgment and not on a motion to dismiss.
190. 416 F.3d 338, 341 (4th Cir. 2005).
191. Id. at 346-47, 348.
192. Id. at 347-48 (citing, inter alia, DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T
Corp., 245 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2001)).
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absence of privileged evidence. But most notably, these cases
are characterized by complete dismissals because the very
subject matter of the suits involved state secrets.
The dismissals in the Totten cases are significantly
different than the dismissals in the Reynolds cases. In the
Reynolds cases, the courts maintain at least the theoretical
possibility that a plaintiff‘s case might move forward based on
alternative, non-privileged evidence. The courts in those cases
often remanded the case in order to determine whether
sufficient non-privileged evidence existed to allow the case to
proceed. This approach is consistent with the approach courts
use for any evidentiary privilege and is in perfect harmony
with Reynolds itself.
The courts in the Totten cases, however, thwarted the
possibility of proceeding on alternative evidence by dismissing
the entire case because its very subject matter was a state
secret. As compared to the Reynolds cases, these cases scarcely
considered the plaintiff‘s need for the evidence, granted
extraordinary deference to the executive branch, and declined
to seriously consider methods of allowing the cases to proceed.
As discussed below, the Government‘s position on the state
secrets privilege in the post-9/11 cases builds on these
characteristics of the Totten cases.
III. The Post-9/11 Cases
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Government‘s position
on the state secrets privilege builds upon the characteristics of
the Totten cases and attempts to give the privilege expanded
and very troubling dimensions. Particularly, the Government
has argued that the courts should accord the executive the
utmost deference in its assertions of the state secrets privilege;
that courts should neglect plaintiffs‘ interests; and that courts
should not consider alternative, non-privileged evidence or
judicial controls to permit the lawsuits to proceed without
privileged material, even when information on the programs
was widely available, often from the Government itself. For
these reasons, and based on the Totten cases discussed above,
the Government has argued that the courts should dismiss
these cases, because their very subject matter involves a state
secret.
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But the Government in the post-9/11 cases has taken its
claim one dangerous step further. Unlike previous cases, the
Government in the post-9/11 cases has argued that the state
secrets privilege is a constitutional doctrine—that it has roots
in the President‘s Article II powers. This unprecedented claim
has garnered one important victory: the Fourth Circuit decision
in El-Masri v. United States. As discussed below, this position
represents a breathtaking expansion of the state secrets
privilege. It means that the state secrets privilege, as a
constitutional doctrine, trumps any consideration of a
plaintiff‘s interests or need for evidence and crowds out any
meaningful role for courts.
Taken along with its other
positions, this extraordinary claim means that the Government
could move for dismissal on the bare assertion that the very
subject of a suit is a state secret, effectively evading any
judicial oversight of the claim.
The Government‘s position on the state secrets privilege in
the post-9/11 cases is characterized by a neglect of any
plaintiff‘s interest or need for evidence, extraordinary deference
to the Government, no consideration of whether or how cases
might proceed without privileged evidence, and complete
dismissal whenever the Government asserts that the very
subject matter of a case is a state secret–all characteristics of
the Totten cases. But the Government‘s position is intensified
in the post-9/11 cases, because of the Government‘s
extraordinary claim that the state secrets privilege is a
constitutional doctrine.
This section examines some of the cases in two closely
guarded and highly controversial programs in the post-9/11
era—the Terrorist Surveillance Program and the extraordinary
rendition program.
A. The Terrorist Surveillance Program
The Government has moved to dismiss cases challenging
the NSA‘s Terrorist Surveillance Program (―TSP‖) because the
very subject matter of the suits involved a state secret. The
TSP included data mining and warrantless interception of
telephone and electronic communications where one party was
located outside the United States and was identified by the
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NSA as connected to a terrorist organization.193 Plaintiffs
challenged the TSP in several cases as a violation of their First
and Fourth Amendment rights and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (―FISA‖).194
Building on the characteristics of the Totten cases, the
Government moved to dismiss an early case, American Civil
Liberties Union v. National Security Agency, on the grounds
that the state secrets privilege protected information necessary
for the plaintiffs to establish standing, that the plaintiffs‘
claims could not be proven or defended without information
protected by state secrets, and that the very subject matter of
the lawsuit, the TSP, was a state secret.195 The Government
argued that the court‘s review is highly deferential196 and that
the plaintiff‘s interest plays no part in the court‘s evaluation of
the Government‘s assertion.197
The Government made nearly identical arguments in other
cases challenging the TSP, including Hepting v. AT&T Corp., a
case against a private telecommunications company for its role
in the TSP program,198 and Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation v.
Bush, a case against government officials.199
193. See generally Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 986-87
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (collecting publicly available materials on the TSP and
describing the program in greater detail).
194. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511,
92 Stat. 1783.
195. 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758-59 (E.D. Mich. 2006), rev’d, 493 F.3d 644
(6th Cir. 2007).
196. Government‘s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
the United States‘ Assertion of the Military and State Secrets Privilege;
Defendants‘ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment; and Defendants‘ Motion to Stay Consideration of Plaintiffs‘
Motion for Summary Judgment, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat‘l Sec.
Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 06-CV-10204) (―Aside
from ensuring that the privilege has been properly invoked as a procedural
matter, the sole determination for the court is whether, under the particular
circumstances of the case, there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national
security, should not be divulged.‖) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
197. Id. (―Thus, in assessing whether to uphold a claim of privilege, the
court does not balance the respective needs of the parties for the
information.‖).
198. 439 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
199. 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218-19 (D. Or. 2006), rev’d, 507 F.3d 1190
(9th Cir. 2007).
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The courts in these cases largely rejected the Government‘s
most sweeping claims, even as they sometimes ruled in the
Government‘s favor. Thus, the Sixth Circuit in American Civil
Liberties Union v. National Security Agency held that without
protected evidence the plaintiffs could not establish that they
were or would be targets of the TSP program.200 The court,
therefore, ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing.201
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit ruled in Al-Haramain Islamic
Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, that evidence necessary for the
plaintiff‘s standing was protected by the state secrets
privilege.202 The district court in Hepting v. AT&T Corp.,
however, denied the Government‘s assertion of the state secrets
privilege.203 The court ruled that public disclosures by the
Government and defendant precluded the Government‘s claim
that the very subject matter of the suit was a state secret.204
And, citing Halkin II, the court declined to decide the
Government‘s other claims—that the Government‘s state
secrets assertion would prevent the plaintiff from establishing
a prima facie case or for AT&T to defend the claim—until the
case proceeded to discovery.205
In these cases, the Government pushed the boundaries of
the Totten cases, arguing that the courts should defer to the
executive‘s assertion of state secrets, that the courts should
neglect the plaintiffs‘ interests, and that the courts should
dismiss cases based only on the complaints whenever the
Government asserts the state secrets privilege. The courts
largely rejected these sweeping claims, issuing rulings that
looked more like the Reynolds cases.
The Government pushed harder—and achieved greater
success—in the extraordinary rendition cases.
B. The Extraordinary Rendition Program
The Government has similarly moved to dismiss cases
challenging its extraordinary rendition program based on the
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

493 F.3d at 659-87.
Id. at 687.
507 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007).
439 F. Supp. 2d at 998-99.
Id. at 994.
Id. at 994-95 (citing Halkin II, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
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very subject matter of the suits.
The Government‘s
extraordinary rendition program involves the secret
transportation and detention outside the United States of
individuals suspected of involvement in terrorist activities.
The Government conducted extraordinary renditions in order
to allow interrogators to question these individuals using
methods that were illegal under U.S. and international laws.206
In El-Masri v. United States, the Government moved to
dismiss the plaintiff‘s complaint on the basis that the very
subject matter of the suit was a state secret.207 The plaintiff in
that case claimed that the Government and government
officials violated international law and his constitutional rights
in conducting the extraordinary rendition. The Government,
employing arguments very similar to those in the TSP cases,
argued that neither the plaintiff nor defendant could establish
their positions without resorting to privileged information and
that the very subject matter of the suit was a state secret.208
But the Government also added a significant new
argument. The Government in El-Masri argued that the state
secrets privilege enjoyed constitutional status209—that it was
rooted in the President‘s Article II powers as the ―sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international
relations.‖210 ―It is the means by which the Executive Branch
exercises its critical constitutional responsibility to protect
secrets of state in the national interest.‖211 The Government, of
course, could cite no case directly on point, as no court had
previously held that the state secrets privilege enjoyed
constitutional status. Instead, the Government argued that
the state secrets privilege was essential to its conduct of foreign
206. See generally Leila Nadya Sadat, Enemy Combatants After Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld: Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from
the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200 (2007).
207. El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d
sub. nom., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
208. Id.
209. Brief of the Appellee at 8, El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296
(4th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1667). The Government argued that ―the Supreme
Court has explained that the state secrets privilege is rooted in, and is an
aspect of, the powers granted to the President by Article II of the
Constitution.‖ Id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).
210. Id. (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 320 (1936)).
211. Id.
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affairs, over which, it argued, it had plenary authority.212
According to the Government, this constitutional basis for
the state secrets privilege meant that it could assert the
The
privilege unilaterally, with no judicial review.213
Government wrote, ―[t]he law is clear that the decision to
invoke the state secrets privilege constitutes the exercise of
duties uniquely confided by the Constitution to the Executive
Branch in order to safeguard the nation and to conduct the
foreign relations of the United States.‖214 Moreover, the
Government argued that the constitutional basis for the
privilege overshadowed any interest the plaintiff may have in
the litigation, reducing the plaintiff‘s interest to a nullity.215 In
short, according to the Government, this constitutional basis
for the state secrets privilege crowded out the judiciary‘s role in
policing the privilege and the plaintiff‘s interest in the
litigation. The new claim thus offered firmer footing for
extreme judicial deference and minimal concern for plaintiffs‘
interests—characteristics of the Totten cases—and expanded
those principles into categorical constitutional rules. According
to the Government, the President‘s power to assert the state
secrets privilege, grounded in Article II, meant that the
President could assert the privilege without review of the
judiciary and without consideration of plaintiffs‘ interests.216
Taken together with the Government‘s argument that the
212. Id. at 8-20.
213. Id. at 5; see also id. at 14 (―Thus, the state secrets privilege has a
constitutional foundation, is interposed as a matter of policy by the Executive
Branch in order to further important foreign policy and national security
concerns, is absolute when properly invoked, and can be asserted at any point
in litigation when the privilege is needed in order to protect state secrets
from disclosure, either purposeful or inadvertent.‖); id. at 16 (―Because the
decision to assert the privilege for secrets of state involves a policy
determination on a matter constitutionally committed to the Executive
Branch, the scope of the inquiry undertaken by the Judicial Branch when the
claim is interposed is very limited.‖).
214. Id. at 5.
215. Id. at 10-11 (―Because of its constitutional underpinning, ‗the
privilege to protect state secrets must head the list‘ of the various
governmental privileges recognized in our courts. . . . Thus, in evaluating a
claim of state secrets privilege, the presiding court does not balance the
interests of the United States in protecting its secrets against the interests of
the litigant in gaining access to the information, for ‗[t]hat balance has
already been struck.‘‖) (citations omitted).
216. Id. at 8-9.
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state secrets privilege required dismissal anytime the very
subject matter of the suit involved state secrets, the
Government‘s constitutional claim meant that it could shut
down any lawsuit merely by asserting that its very subject
matter was a state secret.217
The Fourth Circuit adopted the Government‘s positions.218
In an opinion laden with separation-of-powers considerations,
most tilting toward judicial deference in the face of the
executive‘s assertion of the state secrets privilege, the court
upheld the district court‘s dismissal.219 The court ruled that
the state secrets privilege prevented both the plaintiff and the
defendants from establishing their positions,220 and that the
very subject matter of the case was a state secret.221 In
comparison to the Reynolds cases and the Totten cases
described above, the court exhibited great deference to the
Government and barely considered the plaintiff‘s interests.222
217. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. (Mohamed II), 563
F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded by 579 F.3d 949 (9th Cir.
2009), petition for reh’g en banc granted by 586 F.3d 1108 (―According to the
Government‘s theory, the Judiciary should effectively cordon off all secret
government actions from judicial scrutiny, immunizing the CIA and its
partners from the demands and limits of the law.‖).
218. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007). The
Government nearly won a second important case on this point. As this
Article was being edited, the en banc Second Circuit discussed the state
secrets privilege in both constitutional and evidentiary terms in an
extraordinary rendition case. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574-75, 581
n.14 (2d Cir. 2009). The court seemed torn between a state secrets privilege
rooted in separation-of-powers concerns and a state secrets privilege as a
common law evidentiary privilege. Id. at 581 n.14 (―[T]he state secrets
privilege is often performed witness-by-witness; question-by-question; pageby-page; paragraph-by-paragraph—and can take years. . . . In any event, the
state secrets doctrine has roots in separation of powers principles, and is not
itself devoid of constitutional implications.‖) (citing Dep‘t of Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 303 (4th
Cir. 2007)). But the court expressly declined to rule on the state secrets
privilege, Arar, 585 F.3d at 567, and the plaintiff did not press the issue in
his petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at i, Arar v. Ashcroft, 2010 WL 500089 (Feb. 1, 2010) (No. 09-923).
219. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 313.
220. Id. at 308-10.
221. Id. at 310-11.
222. Id. at 308-10. Judicial deference in El-Masri is perhaps best
illustrated by the court‘s acceptance of the Government‘s claim that even the
vast amount of non-privileged public information on the extraordinary
rendition program, some of it produced by the Government itself, provided an
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Most significantly, the court affirmed the Government‘s
position that the state secrets privilege enjoys constitutional
status:
Although the state secrets privilege was
developed at common law, it performs a function
of constitutional significance, because it allows
the executive branch to protect information
whose secrecy is necessary to its military and
foreign-affairs responsibilities. . . . Significantly,
the Executive‘s constitutional authority is at its
broadest in the realm of military and foreign
affairs. The Court accordingly has indicated that
the judiciary‘s role as a check on presidential
action in foreign affairs is limited. . . . Moreover,
both the Supreme Court and this Court have
recognized that the Executive‘s constitutional
mandate encompasses the authority to protect
national security information. . . . The state
secrets privilege that the United States has
interposed in this civil proceeding thus has a
firm foundation in the Constitution, in addition
to its basis in the common law of evidence.223
Armed with the El-Masri case, the Government made
substantially the same arguments in a Ninth Circuit case. In
Mohamed v. Jeppesen, the plaintiffs again challenged the
Government‘s extraordinary rendition program.224 Citing and
quoting El-Masri liberally throughout its motion to dismiss and
appellate brief, the Government argued that the state secrets

insufficient basis upon which the plaintiff could prove his case. See id.
223. Id. at 303-04 (citations omitted).
224. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. (Mohamed I), 539 F. Supp. 2d
1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d, 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended and
superseded by 579 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), petition for reh’g en banc granted
by 586 F.3d 1108.
These arguments were not unique to the Bush
administration. The Government‘s attorney affirmed at oral argument, after
President Obama took office, that the new administration vetted and
approved these same arguments. Audio file: Oral argument in Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), available at http://
www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id=0000002777.
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privilege was based on the President‘s Article II powers,225 the
courts should review the Government‘s assertion with great
deference,226 the plaintiff‘s interest is immaterial,227 and the
court should dismiss the case because the very subject matter
of the action involved a state secret.228
The district court dismissed the case because the very
subject matter of the action was a state secret,229 but a threejudge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed.230 The panel
disentangled the Totten bar and the Reynolds privilege and
ruled that neither could be so stretched as to support the
Government‘s position in the case.231 The panel also reaffirmed
that the Reynolds privilege was an evidentiary privilege, not a
constitutional doctrine,232 and that any separation-of-powers
considerations cut in favor of, not against, judicial review of the
Government‘s assertion of the state secrets privilege.233 The
panel affirmed that the courts have an active role in evaluating
the executive‘s assertion of the privilege,234 and that the
225. Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment by the United States of America at 6, Mohamed I, 539 F.
Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 07-02798); Redacted, Unclassified Brief
for Intervenor-Appellee the United States at 12, Mohamed II, 563 F.3d 992
(9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-15693).
226. Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment by the United States of America at 7-9, Mohamed I, 539
F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 07-02798); Redacted, Unclassified
Brief for Intervenor-Appellee the United States at 12-13, Mohamed II, 563
F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-15693).
227. Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment by the United States of America at 6-7, Mohamed I, 539
F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 07-02798); Redacted, Unclassified
Brief for Intervenor-Appellee the United States at 13, Mohamed II, 563 F.3d
992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-15693).
228. Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment by the United States of America at 9-11, Mohamed I,
539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 07-02798); Redacted, Unclassified
Brief for Intervenor-Appellee the United States at 15-24, Mohamed II, 563
F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-15693).
229. Mohamed I, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1134-36.
230. Mohamed II, 563 F.3d at 1009.
231. Id. at 1000-06.
232. Id. at 1004-06.
233. Id. at 1004 (―[W]hatever power the United States Constitution
envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy
organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all
three branches when individual liberties are at stake.‖ (citations omitted)).
234. Id.
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plaintiff‘s need for the information is a key determinant in the
scope of the court‘s inquiry.235 On remand, the panel ordered
that the Government assert the state secrets privilege only
with respect to particular secret evidence, and not with respect
to the entire case.236 The panel also ordered the district court
to determine whether the plaintiff‘s case could proceed without
privileged evidence.237 Thus under the panel ruling, and
consistent with the Reynolds cases above, the plaintiff‘s case
could potentially proceed on alternative, non-privileged
material and information about the extraordinary rendition
program.
The Government sought en banc review of the panel
decision, repackaging the arguments it relied upon below.238
The Government may have backed off its claim that the state
secrets privilege is a constitutional doctrine, however, merely
alluding to the President‘s responsibility to protect national
security and not specifically invoking Article II.239 As of this
writing, the case is pending before the full Ninth Circuit.
Thus the Government‘s position in the cases regarding
these two central post-9/11 clandestine programs is
characterized by a neglect of any plaintiff interest or need for
evidence, extraordinary deference to the Government, no
consideration of whether or how cases might proceed without
privileged evidence, and complete dismissal whenever the
Government asserts that the very subject of a case is a state
secret. And while these are also characteristics of the Totten
cases, the Government has intensified them in the post-9/11
cases in part by claiming that the state secrets privilege is a
constitutional doctrine.
The next section explores more how these characteristics
expand the characteristics in the Totten cases, why that
expansion is significant, and why it is wrong.
235. Id. at 1003.
236. Id. at 1009.
237. Id.
238. Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, Mohamed II, 563
F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-15693).
239. Id. at 10-11. Based on oral arguments before the en banc Ninth
Circuit, the more sweeping version of the state secrets privilege is apparently
still in play at the Ninth Circuit. See Audio file: Oral argument in Mohamed
v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/
view_subpage.php?pk_id=0000004702.
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IV. The Post-9/11 State Secrets Privilege and its Problems
The Government‘s new and expanded position on the state
secrets privilege in the post-9/11 cases lacks a solid basis in law
and creates several significant constitutional problems. This
section explores four defining characteristics of the
Government‘s new position and explains how they lack support
or create problems. First it explains why the Government‘s
position that the state secrets privilege is a constitutional
doctrine lacks a basis in law. Next, it explains why the
Government‘s position encouraging more deferential judicial
scrutiny of its claims lacks a basis in law. Third, it considers
some of the problems with the Government‘s position that the
courts should ignore plaintiffs‘ interests. And finally, it
explores some of the problems with the Government‘s position
that courts must dismiss cases where the very subject matter is
a state secret.
This section demonstrates why the Government‘s
extraordinary new position on the state secrets privilege is
unsound, and why any effort to rein in the Government‘s use of
the state secrets privilege must account for each of these four
characteristics.
A. State Secrets as a Constitutional Doctrine
As we have seen, the Government has argued in the post9/11 cases that the state secrets privilege is rooted in the
Constitution. This argument is not only novel, it is baseless.
Neither the origins of the state secrets privilege nor the cases
upon which the Government relies support its claim.
Nothing in either Totten or Reynolds suggests that the
state secrets privilege has roots in the President‘s Article II
powers.240 As we have seen, the Totten bar derived from the
practical policy considerations based on the nature of secret
contracts with the Government, and the Reynolds privilege
240. See Brief of Professors of Constitutional Law, Federal Jurisdiction,
and Foreign Relations Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Mohamed and
Urging Reversal at 3, Mohamed II, 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 0815693) (arguing that the state secrets privilege is an evidentiary privilege,
not a constitutional doctrine).
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evolved as a common law evidentiary privilege.
The
Government‘s novel claim in El-Masri that ―the state secrets
privilege is rooted in, and is an aspect of, the powers granted to
the President by Article II of the Constitution,‖241 and the
Fourth Circuit‘s adoption of that position,242 simply has no
basis in law.
The Government‘s claim and the Fourth Circuit‘s ruling in
El-Masri were based upon the President‘s Article II powers ―in
the field of foreign relations‖ and the presumed role that the
state secrets privilege played in furthering those powers.243
But no court had previously linked the state secrets privilege to
presidential powers ―in the field of foreign relations‖ (or, for
that matter, any other Article II powers) in this way. Perhaps
the closest the courts have come to this link is in United States
v. Nixon,244 the case relied upon by both the Government and
the Fourth Circuit. That case, however, merely discussed
Reynolds and the Reynolds privilege in passing dicta, and
notably, state secrets was not at issue.245 The link in that case
between the presidential powers and the state secrets doctrine
was only a spatial one: the Court merely discussed the
President‘s powers and the Reynolds case in back-to-back
paragraphs.246 The Nixon Court made no explicit link, much
less the link that the Government and Fourth Circuit made,
between the two.
In El-Masri, the Fourth Circuit also relied upon Reynolds
in concluding that the state secrets privilege is rooted in the
Constitution.247 The Fourth Circuit wrote that ―Reynolds itself
suggested that the state secrets doctrine allowed the Court to
avoid the constitutional conflict that might have arisen had the
judiciary demanded that the Executive disclose highly sensitive

241. Brief of the Appellee 8, El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th
Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1667) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710
(1974)).
242. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 303-04.
243. Brief of the Appellee 8, El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th
Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1667) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
244. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
245. Id. at 710-11.
246. Id.
247. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 303.
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military secrets.‖248 But Reynolds had nothing to do with state
secrets as a constitutional doctrine. As the Reynolds Court
clearly noted, it did not rule on this question.249 Instead, the
passage that the Fourth Circuit relied upon from Reynolds
summarized the Government’s claim in that case.250 The
Reynolds Court avoided ruling on this claim,251 not on the
―constitutional conflict that might have arisen.‖252 And it
avoided this claim merely because it found a narrower ground
for its decision.253 The Fourth Circuit‘s use of Reynolds—that
the Court‘s failure to address the government‘s claim amounts
to an endorsement of that claim—simply distorts that case.254
Finally, the Government relied upon United States v.
Marchetti to support its argument that the privilege has a
constitutional basis.255 But even by the Government‘s own
reckoning, that case only holds that intelligence gathering is
within the President‘s Article II powers.256 It says nothing
about withholding state secrets as derived from Article II
powers.
Thus the Government‘s claim about the constitutional
basis of the state secrets privilege, which it continues to press,
lacks a basis in law. Far worse, the Government has used this
claim to argue further that the constitutional basis of the state
secrets privilege crowds out any meaningful judicial review of
the Government‘s assertion of the privilege and any
consideration of plaintiffs‘ interests.257 The Government‘s
248. Id.
249. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Brief of the Appellee at 9, El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296
(4th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1667) (quoting United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d
1309, 1315 (4th Cir. 1972)).
256. Id. (―Gathering intelligence information and the other activities of
the [CIA], including clandestine affairs against other nations, are all within
the President‘s constitutional responsibility for the security of the Nation as
the Chief Executive and as Commander in Chief of our Armed forces.‖
(quoting United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1315 (4th Cir. 1972)).
257. Brief of the Appellee at 5, El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296
(4th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1667); see also id. at 14 (―Thus, the state secrets
privilege has a constitutional foundation, is interposed as a matter of policy
by the Executive Branch in order to further important foreign policy and
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position, then, unbalances the carefully weighed separation of
powers in our Constitution by virtually eliminating the
judiciary from consideration of these cases.258 Moreover, as
discussed below, it runs up against plaintiffs‘ constitutional
interests in access to the courts.
B. State Secrets as Curtailing Judicial Review
In the post-9/11 cases, the Government has argued for
unprecedented judicial deference. The Government‘s position
hit a high point in El-Masri, when it argued that the
constitutional basis for the state secrets privilege virtually
eliminated any role for the courts.
But as we have seen, Reynolds contemplated a meaningful
role for the judiciary in examining the Government‘s assertions
of the state secrets privilege, while also balancing the need for
secrecy:
Judicial control over the evidence in a case
cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive
officers. Yet we will not go so far as to say that
the court may automatically require a complete
disclosure to the judge before the claim of
privilege will be accepted in any case. It may be
possible to satisfy the court, from all the
circumstances of the case, that there is a
reasonable danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters which, in
the interest of national security, should not be
divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for
the privilege is appropriate, and the court should
national security concerns, is absolute when properly invoked, and can be
asserted at any point in litigation when the privilege is needed in order to
protect state secrets from disclosure, either purposeful or inadvertent.‖); id.
at 16 (―Because the decision to assert the privilege for secrets of state
involves a policy determination on a matter constitutionally committed to the
Executive Branch, the scope of the inquiry undertaken by the Judicial
Branch when the claim is interposed is very limited.‖).
258. See generally Amanda Frost, The State Secret Privilege and
Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931 (2007) (examining in greater
detail the state secrets privilege‘s implications for separation-of-powers
principles).
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not jeopardize the security which the privilege is
meant to protect by insisting upon an
examination of the evidence, even by the judge
alone, in chambers.259
Under Reynolds, the court determines whether the
Government‘s claim meets the technical requirements of the
privilege. If the Government properly invoked the privilege,
then the court evaluates the depth of its own probe into the
assertion, based on the plaintiff‘s need for the underlying
information. At this step, courts have reviewed in camera the
requisite affidavits and the underlying evidence and materials
sought to be excluded. The courts have even required a public
defense of the claim of privilege. The depth of the probe
depends on the plaintiff‘s need for the evidence. Finally, the
court determines whether and how the case will proceed
without the privileged evidence.
This is a far cry from the extreme judicial deference that
the Government proposes in the post-9/11 cases, especially
when the Government argues against virtually any role for the
courts, because the privilege is rooted in Article II principles.260
C. State Secrets as Negating Plaintiffs’ Interests
The Government and some courts have moved toward
eliminating consideration of a plaintiff‘s need, or of any
plaintiff interest in the litigation, as part of the state secrets
calculus. They argue and hold that the state secrets privilege
is absolute and that a plaintiff‘s interest has no role in applying
the privilege—there is no balancing test for the state secrets
privilege. This argument, however, is belied by Reynolds itself,
and it runs up against plaintiffs‘ constitutional interests in
pursuing their claims.
Under Reynolds, a plaintiff‘s need for the underlying
evidence plays an important role in the court‘s evaluation of an
assertion of the state secrets privilege; it alone determines how
closely the court should scrutinize the Government‘s claim. ―In
each case, the showing of necessity which is made will
259. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
260. Frost, supra note 258, at 1955-56.
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determine how far the court should probe in satisfying itself
that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate.‖261
As described more fully above, courts have found that a
plaintiff‘s need ranges from desperate—where the sought-after
evidence was necessary to establish standing or a prima facie
case—to insignificant—where alternative, non-privileged
evidence and information permitted a case to move forward.
Courts have adjusted their scrutiny of the Government‘s state
secrets assertion accordingly, balancing the Government‘s
interest in secrecy against the plaintiff‘s interest in judicial
redress.
The Government‘s arguments against considering a
plaintiff‘s interests confuse or conflate the two critical steps in
the Reynolds framework. In the first step, determining how to
scrutinize the assertion of the Government‘s claim, the court‘s
calibration turns only on the plaintiff‘s need.262 But in the
second step, once the court has probed the Government‘s claim
and determined that the privilege applies, the plaintiff‘s need
becomes irrelevant and ―even the most compelling necessity
cannot overcome the claim of privilege.‖263
The Government has argued, and some courts have held,
that a plaintiff‘s need is not relevant and that the state secrets
privilege involves no balancing of interests.264 This argument
confuses the irrelevancy of a plaintiff‘s interest in the second
step and of a plaintiff‘s need overall. It results in a position
that takes a plaintiff‘s need out of the state secrets calculus—a
result inconsistent with Reynolds itself.
D. Dismissal Where the Very Subject Matter is a State Secret
Finally, the Government has argued consistently in the
261. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 305-06 (4th Cir.
2007) (―The degree to which such a reviewing court should probe depends in
part on the importance of the assertedly privileged information to the
position of the party seeking it. . . . Moreover, no attempt is made to balance
the need for secrecy of the privileged information against a party‘s need for
the information‘s disclosure . . . .‖) (citations omitted). In an opinion stated
somewhat confusingly, the court apparently declined to consider, or to review,
the district court‘s consideration of the plaintiff‘s need.
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post-9/11 cases that courts should dismiss the cases because
their very subject matter are state secrets. The Government
supports this claim largely on the basis of the Totten cases. To
be clear, this claim is substantially stronger than the claim
that a case should be dismissed because the plaintiff cannot
establish standing or a prima facie case, or because the
defendant cannot defend the case, as a result of privileged
evidence. The latter claim, affirmed by the Reynolds cases, is
an evidentiary claim. It protects evidence, not information,
and allows the plaintiff to establish his or her case with
alternative, non-privileged evidence. If no such evidence exists,
then, as with any other evidentiary privilege, the claim may be
dismissed.
But the former claim—the Government‘s claim in the post9/11 cases—is an absolute ban on litigation dealing with
certain issues or programs, even if non-privileged evidence
exists to establish a claim. This claim operates more like the
justiciability doctrine than an evidentiary privilege and, by the
Government‘s reckoning, allows the Government to dodge suits
with very little judicial oversight. Indeed, this claim is
problematic for three reasons: it lacks a solid basis in law, it
confuses evidence and information, and it undermines a
plaintiff‘s fundamental right to access the courts.
1. The Paucity of Legal Support
The Government‘s argument in the post-9/11 cases—that
the case must be dismissed because the very subject matter of
the lawsuit is a state secret—has no support in the law of state
secrets. The cases that created the privilege cannot carry the
weight of this extraordinary claim, and the more recent cases
most often cited in support of this claim are themselves built
upon empty analysis.
First and most clearly, the claim has no basis in Reynolds
or Totten. As we have seen, Reynolds is an evidentiary
privilege. Properly invoked, the Reynolds privilege permits a
party to establish facts based on alternative, non-privileged
evidence. Reynolds itself mentioned alternative, non-privileged
evidence upon which the plaintiffs might have developed their
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case.265 Reynolds authorizes dismissal only when a plaintiff
cannot establish a case without privileged evidence. Neither
its holding nor its reasoning supports dismissal when the very
subject matter of the litigation is a state secret.266
Totten also does not support the claim of privilege. As we
have seen, Totten provides a narrow ban on litigating secret
spy contracts with the Government. It is based on unique
policy considerations that apply only in such cases, and not
more generally to any secret or clandestine government
programs.267 As discussed in more detail above, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed this understanding of Totten in Tenet v. Doe
in 2005.
Reynolds and Totten together cannot provide a basis for
dismissing a case because the very subject matter of the case is
a state secret.
As we have seen, the Supreme Court
unanimously held in Tenet v. Doe that the Reynolds evidentiary
privilege and the Totten bar are two distinct principles, even if
they share some common ground.268 If neither alone supports
the claim that a case may be dismissed because its very subject
matter is a state secret—and if, as explained above, they
represent two very different principles that cannot be
aggregated—then even together they cannot support such a
claim.
Moreover, the recent cases are themselves built upon
empty analysis and, when read closely, provide no solid support
for this claim. For example, the Government frequently cited
Kasza in support of its argument. While the Ninth Circuit in
Kasza dismissed the entire case because its very subject matter
was a state secret,269 the cases it cited—Reynolds, Totten,
Farnsworth Cannon, and Weston v. Lockheed Missiles & Space
Co.—do not support this holding. Reynolds and Totten do not
support it for the reasons discussed above.
Farnsworth
Cannon was an en banc summary affirmance of the district

265. 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953).
266. See Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1001 (9th Cir. 1998)
(discussing why Reynolds does not support dismissal because the very subject
matter of the suit is a state secret).
267. Id. (discussing why Totten does not support dismissal because the
very subject matter of the suit is a state secret).
268. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2005).
269. Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1170.
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court‘s unpublished dismissal on the pleadings, without
citation to a single case or authority, and with rather
ambiguous language about the precise basis of its ruling.270
The court in Weston did not even rule on this issue.271 It
merely stated in dicta that ―the state secrets privilege alone
can be the basis for dismissal of an entire case.‖272 This is
ambiguous support, at best, for Kasza‘s holding. It is hardly
the stuff of sound legal doctrine. And just in case there were
any questions about Kasza‘s ruling, the Ninth Circuit recently
disavowed it in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.273 and
ruled that this theory cannot provide the basis for complete
dismissal.274
Other cases regularly cited in support of this claim are
similarly weak and merely create something like a case-law
house of cards. For example, the court in Fitzgerald v.
Penthouse International, Ltd. upheld a dismissal because the
very subject matter of the case was a state secret.275 But it
only relied upon Totten and Farnsworth Cannon in support of
this conclusion.276 Similarly, the court in Zuckerbraun v.
General Dynamics Corp. merely cited Reynolds and Totten in
support of its conclusion that dismissal was required because
the very subject matter of the case was a state secret.277 The
court in Bowles v. United States merely cited Fitzgerald,278 and
the court in Bareford v. General Dynamics Corp. cited
Farnsworth Cannon and Bowles.279
The court in DTM
270. Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th Cir.
1980) (en banc) (per curiam) (―[A]ny attempt on the part of the plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case would so threaten disclosure of state secrets that
the overriding interest of the United States and the preservation of its state
secrets precludes any further attempt to pursue this litigation.‖).
271. Weston v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 881 F.2d 814, 816 (9th
Cir. 1989).
272. Id.
273. 563 F.3d 992, 1002 n.5 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded by 579
F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), petition for reh’g en banc granted by 586 F.3d 1108.
274. Id. at 1003.
275. 776 F.2d 1236, 1243 (4th Cir. 1985).
276. Id. at 1241-42.
277. Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547-48 (2d Cir.
1991).
278. Bowles v. United States, 950 F.2d 154, 156 (4th Cir. 1991).
279. Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir.
1992), vacated in part, No. 91-2432, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25805 (5th Cir.
Oct. 14, 1992).
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Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp. cited only Fitzgerald,280 and
the court in Sterling v. Tenet cited Fitzgerald, Farnsworth
Cannon, and DTM Research.281 Other cases, including ElMasri, recycle these cases, occasionally adding some of the
Reynolds cases in support of the claim that the state secrets
privilege may require complete dismissal of a case.282 Of course
the Reynolds cases provide no support for the claim that courts
must dismiss cases in which the very subject matter is a state
secret. They hold only that courts must dismiss cases in which
evidence necessary to establish standing or a prima facie case
is protected. Thus the case support for this claim is quite
tenuous, ultimately turning on recycled citations to cases that
themselves lack a foundation in the law.
2. The Confusion Between Evidence and Information
The sweeping claim here—that courts must dismiss cases
in which the very subject matter is a state secret—confuses
evidence and information by applying an evidentiary privilege
to sources well beyond any disputed evidence but that
nevertheless supply the information in the evidence. This
curtails a plaintiff‘s ability to establish a claim through
alternative, non-privileged material and expands the Totten
ban or the Reynolds privilege (or both) well beyond the scope of
those rulings.
Courts that have upheld dismissals on this basis have
banned all evidence, privileged or not, so long as the
information in that evidence might relate to a state secret.
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. illustrates the
strangeness of this position.283 In that case, the Government
280. DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir.
2001).
281. Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 347-48 (4th Cir. 2005).
282. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 306-07 (4th Cir.
2007). El-Masri also cites Tenet v. Doe in support of this claim. The Court
wrote that Doe ―approvingly quoted Reynolds‘s discussion of Totten as a
matter in which dismissal on the pleadings was appropriate because the very
subject matter of the action was a state secret.‖ Id. at 306. But as discussed
above, nothing in Doe suggests that the Totten bar, or any like version of the
state secrets privilege, applies outside the narrow facts of that case.
283. 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended and superseded by 579 F.3d
949 (9th Cir. 2009), petition for reh’g en banc granted by 586 F.3d 1108.
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argued that the court should dismiss the case because the very
subject matter involved a state secret. But by the time the case
reached the Ninth Circuit, the very subject matter of the case,
the Government‘s extraordinary rendition program, was well
known by the public and even acknowledged by the
Government and government officials in widely publicized and
non-privileged sources.284 Yet the Government‘s position would
have prevented the plaintiff from establishing his claim based
on these alternative, non-privileged sources. Bizarrely, the
Government‘s position would have even prevented the plaintiff
from telling his own story in pleadings, discovery, or court. The
Government‘s assertion of the evidentiary privilege, then,
would have cut off not only all privileged evidence, but all
―secret‖ information about the extraordinary rendition
program.
This position, adopted in El-Masri,285 represents an
extraordinary expansion of both the Reynolds privilege and the
Totten ban. As a claim of evidentiary privilege under Reynolds,
it means that for the state secrets privilege—alone among
evidentiary privileges—the information, not the evidence,
would be paramount. As a result, the Reynolds privilege would
stretch beyond all recognition and morph into a rule of
justiciability. Alternatively, as a claim under Totten, it means
that any government program, not just government spy
contracts, might be a state secret. This would stretch the logic
of Totten and subject any government action to a claim of state
secrets. Either way—as a claim under the Reynolds privilege
or as a claim under the Totten ban—this position would create
an absolute privilege with no definable boundaries. Taken
with the Government‘s other extraordinary positions, it means
that anytime the Government claims that the very subject
matter of a suit involves a state secret, the case must be
dismissed.
3. The Failure to Consider the Plaintiff‘s Interests
Finally, this position runs up against a plaintiff‘s
constitutional interests in access to the courts. Plaintiffs have
284. See generally Sadat, supra note 206.
285. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 303.
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a fundamental right, rooted in due process and equal protection
principles, against government interference with access to the
courts. The Supreme Court most recently affirmed this wellestablished right in Tennessee v. Lane.286 The Court in that
case upheld Congress‘s authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to require state and local governments
to accommodate persons with disabilities by providing access to
the courts.287 The Court ruled that Congress could so regulate
state and local governments under Section 5, because the
underlying right, access to the courts, was fundamental.288
Just as the plaintiff in Lane had a fundamental right to
access the court, so too do the plaintiffs in cases potentially
involving state secrets. The Government‘s position in the post9/11 cases, however, threatens to curtail this interest, cutting it
off entirely without any meaningful judicial review.
V. Conclusion
The Government‘s position, and at least one circuit court‘s
ruling, on the state secrets privilege in the cases challenging
the Government‘s clandestine post-9/11 programs represents a
dramatic expansion of the privilege. This expansion has four
characteristics. First, the Government now claims that the
state secrets privilege has a constitutional pedigree. Next, the
Government argues for great judicial deference when
examining assertions of the state secrets privilege. Third, the
Government has argued for complete dismissal, on the
pleadings, when the very subject matter of a case involves state
secrets. And finally, the Government argues that a plaintiff‘s
interest should not play a role in evaluating state secrets
claims.
The last three characteristics simply continue a trend in
286. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
287. Id. at 533-34.
288. Id. at 532-33 (―The Due Process Clause also requires the States to
afford certain civil litigants a ‗meaningful opportunity to be heard‘ by
removing obstacles to their full participation in judicial proceedings.‖) (citing
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S.
102 (1996)). International law recognizes a similar right, the right to an
effective remedy. Brief for Redress and the International Commission of
Jurists as Amici Curiae in Support of the Plaintiffs-Appellants, Mohamed II,
563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009).
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one line of cases on the state secrets privilege. But the
Government‘s new claim that the state secrets privilege is a
constitutional doctrine amplifies those characteristics. This
means that the Government now presses a position that courts
should completely dismiss any action, with little or no judicial
review, when the Government asserts that the very subject of
the case involves a state secret.
Efforts to reform the privilege must take account of these
characteristics. Current proposed legislation falls far short.
Congress must go much further to address these characteristics
if it truly seeks to control the effects of the Government‘s
sweeping state secrets assertions.
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